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While it offers great potential in this regard, the implications of regret theory to the
context ofcomplex, multi-attribute decision-making has gone largely unexplored. In this
paper we examine the mle of regret in consumer choice across three studies. In the first
study, we examine the process by which regret influences subsequent decisions. We find that
satisfaction only partially mediates the effect of regret on repurchase intentions. [n the
second study, we examine the consequences ofmaintaining the status quo (repeat purchase)
versus action (switching) in the context of prior experience being either positive or negative.
Results are consistent with prediction, offering evidence counter to the prevailing theory that
action is necessarily regretted more than maintaining the status quo. Decision-makers seem
less likely to blame themselves for a decision when there were good reasons (e.g., a negative
prior experience) supporting it. [n our final study we examine the role ofanticipated regret in
contexts where risk is relatively low (e.g., long distance telephone providers) and relatively
high (e.g., personal computers). We manipulate the pmbability of feedback, predicting that
subjects will gravitate toward the altetnative on which feedback will be received. Results are
largely supportive of our predictions. Choice share for the risky altetnative is greater when
feedback is expected to be t~eceived on it and is less when feedback is expected to be received
on the less risky altemative. Thus, consumets appear to be regret averse in addition to
exhibiting risk aversion. Furtlter, this effect is gtrater as switching costs inerease.
Implications for researchers and practitioners are discussed.
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Let us consider some of the consequences to be expected if there dces, indeed,
exist such immediate post-decision salience ofdissonance. Phenomenally, such
salience ofdissonance might be experienced as a feeling of regret, something that
most ofus have felt, probably, at one time or another. A person, for example,
may shop around for an automobile to buy, investigate several kinds, and finally
decide on which to purchase. As soon as the purchase is accomplished and final,
he may well be assailed by a sudden feeling of"Oh, my, what have [ done!"
(Festinger 1964, p. 99)
Regret is "the painful sensation of recognizing that `what is' compares unfavorably
with `what might have been"' (Sugden 1985, p. 77). The experience of postdecisional regret
is conditional for the most part on knowledge of the outcomes of rejected altematives. In
other words, regret results from comparing the outcome (either realized or potential) of the
chosen alternative to the outcome ofa forgone altemative. When the forgone outcome
exceeds the chosen outcome, regret follows. If the forgone outcome is wotse than the
received outcome, rejoicing is experienced.
As suggested by the excerpt above, regret has primarily been examined as a post-
decision consttuct in the psychology litetature (e.g., Gilovich and Medvec 1995). The
retrospective mental construction of the forgone altemative (i.e., in instances where the
forgone outcome is not directly observed) has been a topic of increased interest in social
psychology, spawning a special volume devoted to the subject of "counterfactual thinking"
(Roese and Olson 1995). In contrast, regret has been studied as a pre-choice construct by
decision analysts (e.g., Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden 1982). Empirical support for regret
theory has been teported in the context of lotteries (e.g., Josephs et al. 1992; Ritov 1996;
Zeelenberg et al. 1996), simple investment decisions (e.g., Zeelenberg and Beattie 1997), and
negotiations (Larrick and Boles 1995). Regret has even been the subject of a best-selling
non-fiction book (Landman 1993).
It is relatively easy to imagine how regret can occur in consumer brand choice - any
instance in which a consumer chooses between alternatives and may later discover the
performance ofa forgone altemative. For example, when dining in a restaurant, someone
else in the party may order a forgone altetnative. Alternatively, a consumer may purchase a
product, only to subsequently see the product and the forgone alternatives rated by
Consumers Reports. While regret is by definition a post-outcome construct, a central
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concern vis-à-vis consumer choice is the effect of ot,p ential regret ( Janis and Mann 1977) in
the choice process.
Surprisingly, regret theory has received little attention in the context of the more
complex, multi-attribute decisions frequently encountered by consumers. Post-consumption
regret effects on satisfaction have been demonstrated (Inman, Dyer, and Jia 1997; Taylor
1997) and anticipatory regret effects have been reported in the context of whether to take
advantage of a promotion (Inman and McAlister 1994; Simonson 1992). However, while it
offers great potential, the relevance of regret theory to the context of brand choice has been
relatively unexplored. Such is the purpose of this reseazch - the examination of regret's
efiects in consumer decision-making. We begin by outlining how regret can exert an
influence at several stages in the consumer decision-making process. We then explore
several aspects of these influences across a series of three studies and end with a discussion
of the studies' implications and directions for future research.
REGRET AND DECISION-MAKING
Figure 1 diagrams the role of regret throughout the decision-making process.
Working our way backward through Figure 1, post-decision regret may result in
"downstream effects" whereby psychological consequences (e.g., post-choice valuation,
satisfaction) are influenced. At least two studies (e.g., Inman et aL 1997; Taylor 1997) have
demonstrated that forgone outcomes influence satisfaction independently of the expectancy-
disconfirmation paradigm (e.g., Oliver 1977, 1980). Further, the influence on satisfaction
should lead to a corresponding effect on behavíoral consequences such as repurchase
intentions (Anderson and Sullivan 1993; Bearden and Teel 1983).
Whether satisfaction completely mediates the regret-repurchase intentions
relationship has heretofore never been subjected to empirical test. This is the focus of Study
1. We do this by manipulating outcome feedback and assessing the effects of regret on
satisfaction and subsequent purchase probability using the method described by Baron and
Kenny (1986). As shown in Figure l, we expect satisfaction to mediate the effect of regret
on behavioral consequences (e.g., purchase intentions).
- Insert Figure 1 about here -
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As mentioned earlier, regret occurs as a result ofoutcome feedback. Thus, feedback
is a central issue in regret theory and several studies have shown that feedback indeed
inFluences levels of experienced regret (e.g., Ritov and Baron 1995). Further, regret is not
uniform for all decisions. Several aspects of the decision context have been shown to
influence feelings of regret. For instance, decisions to take action rather than maintain the
status quo tend to result in greater regret (e.g., Gilovich and Medvec 1995), as do contexts
wherein the decision-maker feels more responsible for the outcome (e.g., Zeelenberg, van
Dijk and Manstead 1998c). T'hese and the other contextual variables shown in Fígure 1
should moderate regret effects and are a ripe area for research.
In our second study, we examine the consequences of inaction versus action in the
cantext of prior experience heing either positive or negative. As we subsequently discuss in
more detail, the decision-making literature has consistently reported that inaction tends to be
valued over action (e.g., Rcese and Olson 1995), presumably because the forgone alternative
is more salient in the case of action (i.e., the forgone altemative is the "status quo"). We
argue that there are also situations where regret may be greater in the case of inaction than
action. For instance, if negative infonnation on the current course ofaction is experienced
but no action is taken, then greater regret should be experienced if the subsequent outcome is
also negative. In such instances, action should be preferred to inaction. Thus, we anticipate a
disordinal action x prior experience interaction.
Finally, regret can have "upstream effects" to the extent that feelings of regret are
anticipated and considered during the decision (e.g., Janis and Mann 1977). Several
researchers (Bell 1982; Inman et al. 1997; Loomes and Sugden 1982; Mellers et al. 1998)
have formulated decision theories that take the probability of rcgret into account. Classical,
prospect-based, decision making theories assume that an alternative's expected utility is
solely dependent on the probabilities of the positive and negative outcomes associated with
that alternative. In contrast, regret theory posits that an altemative's utility is also dependent
on the potential feelings evoked by the outcomes of rejected alternatives (weighted by their
probability ofoccurrence). Empirical work pmvides support for the notion that people take
regret into account when making decisions (e.g., Parker, Stradling and Manstead 1996;
Richard, van der Pligt, and de Vries 1996; Simonson 1992). These studies address the effect
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of the anticipation of regret on risk attitude and have argued that regret results in risk
aversion. Several studies have found this effect on risk attitude, focusing on manipulations
that make the possibility of post-decisional regret more salient.
Simonson's (1992) paper is the seminal work regarding regret effects in consumer
choice. His study focused on (a) consumer decisions to make a promotional purchase in the
current period versus waiting for a possibly better sale in the next period and (b) trade-oft's
between brand name and price. Subjects in the regret condition were asked to anticipate
feelings of regret and responsibility associated with their decision and were explicitly told
that they would receive outcome feedback on sale prices in both periods. Expectations of
feedback and consideration of feelings of regret and responsibility resulted in subjects being
more likely to make their purchase in the eazlier period. Paradoxically, subjects reported that
they would feel greater regret if they selected the well-known, more expensive brand, but
were more likely to choose this brand than the lesser-known, cheaper altemative. A possible
explanation for this is that they perceived the probability ofactually regretting the purchase
of the well-known brand to be very low.
In our final study we examine whether potential regret can intluence consumer
choice. We expand the understanding of anticipatory regret effects on several dimensions.
First, we argue that the anticipation of regret could result in either risk aversion or risk
seeking. Which of the two results obtains is dependent on whether feedback is expected on
the risky alternative or on the less risky altemative (Zeelenberg et al. 1996). In other words,
there are situations in which the risky option is the regret minimizing option (i.e., situations
in which there will always be feedback on the outcome of the risky option, while the safe
option will only be resolved if chosen). We manipulate probability of feedback across
alternatives in four scenazios, alternating the option (i.e., risky or less risky) on which
feedback will be received. If consumers are regret averse, they should choose the alternative
on whích feedback will be received. Interestingly, this can result in risk seeking behavior.
Further, we expect stronger effects in contexts where switching costs are relatively high than
where switching costs are relatively low.
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STUDY 1
In the first study we focus on the downstream part of our regret effects continuum.
This study was designed to investigate both the psychological and behavioral consequences
of regretted consumer decisions. In so doing, we replicate the satisfaction-related flndings of
Inman et al. (1997) and Taylor (1997) and extend their work to behavioral consequences.
More precisely, we test the notion that when consumers opt for a particular brand, the
satisfaction they experience depends not only on the perfortnance of the chosen brand, but
also to a large extent on the regret and rejoicing produced by the feedback on the forgone
alternative(s). Second, we also test whether these regret effects carry over and influence
purchase intentions as well or are mediated by satisfaction.
The setup of the ~tudy is as follows. We have subjects make a choice between two
products. After having chosen, they use this product in order to have direct experience with
it, simulating a normal consumption experience. In addition to the information subjects may
obtain from their own experience, they receive outcome feedback for both the chosen and the
forgone product. This feedback is provided in the form of "Consumer Reports" evaluations.
The evaluation of the forgone product could be better than (regret condition), worse than
(rejoicing condition), or similar (neutral condition) to the chosen product. Next, satisfaction,
purchase intentions and several possible covariates were assessed. This experimental setup
allows us to test for psychological (i.e., satisfaction) and subsequent behavioral consequences
(i.e., purchase intention) of regretted consumer decisions. [t also enables us to test whether
satisfaction mediates the effects of regret on subsequent purchase intentions.
Relatively little is known about the possible consequences of retrospective regret on
satisfaction. Findings of three recent studies by Inman et al. (1997), Taylor ( I 997) and
Zeelenberg et al. (1998b) provide some insight as to how this influence could take place and
what form it could take. Inman et aL (1997) develop a generalized utility model ofchoice
that incorporates regret effects. In a study involving lotteries, they find strong support for
their assertion that regret influences post-choice valuation and satisfaction. Taylor (1997)
makes a similar prediction and in a study of satisfaction with movies, finds that expectations
concerning forgone alternatives can influence satisfaction with the chosen fitm. Finally,
Zeelenberg et al. (1998b) focus on the phenomenology of regret and show that the experience
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of regret involves the tendency to kick oneself, the tendency to correct one's mistake, and the
motivation to undo the event.
We predict that in the present study, consumers' satisfaction with the obtained
product is partially dependent on the regret or rejoicing caused by the feedback on the
forgone altemative, so that regret subjects will be less satisfied (and rejoicing subjects more
satisfied) relative to subjects in the neutral condition. However, we go one step beyond
simply testing for regret effects on satisfaction. We also study regret effects on subsequent
purchase intentions. As can be seen from Figure 1, we expect that this effect is mediated by
satisfaction with the chosen productrservice. The influence of the experience of regret on
consumer intentions, behavior after a regretted decision, or subsequent purchase dedsions
have not yet been subjected to empirical investigation.
The only published study of which we are aware that experimentally investigates the
impact ofexperienced regret on subsequent decisions is Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997,
Experiment 3). However, this study focussed on regret effects in a rather formal negotiation
setting, the ultimatum game (e.g., Camerer and Thaler 1995). After subjects made their
ultimatum offer they learned that it had been accepted. Next, subjects received feedback on
how much less they could have offered and still had their offer accepted. Subjects whose
offer could have been 10 Guilders lower experienced more regret than did subjects whose
offer could have been only 2 Guilders lower. Importantly, when participants were asked to
play a second round of the ultimatum game (against another responder) their offers were
influenced by the amount of regret experienced - the more they regretted having otiered too
much money to the responder in the first game, the lower their second offer. [t therefore
seems that subjects engaged in a sort of regret management; they behaved in such a way that
their current regret would be minimized and future regret would be avoided.
In our study, we make a number of important extensions to previous work. First, we
test for regret effects in a consumer decision-making context. Most consumer choices are
multi-attribute decisions, where comparisons ofdifferent products involve much more
cognitive processing, integration of infortnation, and trade-offs between different attributes,
as opposed to a situation where the outcomes are monetary. Second, the subjects in our study
are given direct experience with the product. Having subjects actually use the product is a
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way to produce stable attitudes towazd the product that are more predictive of future behavior
and resistant to change (e.g., Fazio and Zanna 1981), and thus provides a more conservative
test of the predictions. Finally, in the present study satisfaction with the obtained product is
assessed, allowing us to test for the mediational role of satisfaction to better understand the
prncess by which regret influences subsequent behavior.
METHOD
SubjeNs and Design. Seventy-six undergraduate business students at a large Western
university participated in the first study. We manipulated outcome feedback at three levels
(regret, neutral, rejoicing) in a between-subjects design.
Procedura Subjects were asked tn choose between two brands of writing
instruments. Halfof the subjects chose between brands of retractable pens (Sheaffer and
Parker) and the other half chose between brands of inechanical pencils (Staedtler and
Pentel).' Subjects were told that the study regazded consumer decision-making for writing
instruments. Upon debriefing, two subjects guessed the study's actual purpose and their
results were omitted fmm the analysis. Prior to making their choice, subjects were informed
that they would be allowed to keep the writing instrument that they chose to evaluate. This
was done to increase subjects' involvement with the task. Subjects were run individually to
eliminate extemal influences.
Subjects were given the writing instruments in the original packaging and were asked
to imagine that they were considering purchasing a writing instrument for themselves. Upon
deciding which writing instrument to evaluate, subjects were given that instrument to
evaluate. Each subject was asked to print and write a given sentence using the chosen
insttument. Following this, subjects were asked several filler questions regazding their usage
of pens~pencils, brand awazeness, salient attributes, and distribution channels.
Subjects were then exposed to the manipulation: a"Consumer Reports" evaluation of
both writing instruments. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: regret,
neutral, and rejoicing. In the regret condition, subjects were exposed to a favorable
evaluation of the forgone pen, coupled with an unfavorable evaluation of the chosen pen.
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The valence of the evaluations was reversed in the rejoicing condition. In the neutral
condition, the two pens were evaluated be being quite similar to one another. A samplc
condition is shown in the appendix.
Measures. Subjects were then asked several questions, scaled 1-12: difficulty in
initially deciding between the two writing instruments (12-difficult), satisfaction with the
chosen alternative (12-satisfied), overall evaluation of the chosen alternative (] 2-very good),
likelihood to make the same selection given what they had leamed about the two writing
instruments (12-yes), importance of price (12-important), and familiarity with each brand
(12-familiar). The satisfaction and evaluation measures were summed to create a satisfaction
measure (a-0.90). As a manipulation check, subjects were also asked the price they would
expect to pay for each writing instrument.
In terms of the purchase intentions question, we made it clear that subjects were to
provide their likelihood of making the same selection "given what you know now" (i.e., the
performance of the chosen writing instrument and the "Corr.rumerReporis evaluation" of
both writing instruments). We designed the question to provide a measure of the effect of
regret on the subseauent choice (i.e., on repurchase probability). This is particularly
important in a marketing context where a product's perforrnance is fairly consistent over time
and where outcome feedback may affect the repurchase decision.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the means by condition. First, the manipulation appears to have been
successful. Subjects expected to pay more for the chosen altemative than for the forgone
altemative in the regret condition ( i.e., á2.29 more) and to pay less than the forgone
altemative in the rejoicing condition (i.e., á2.22 less). Subjects expected to pay slightly more
for the chosen altemative than for the forgone altemative in the neutral condition (i.e., 50.88
more). A 2(pen or pencil) x 3(regret, neutral, rejoicing) ANOVA with the difference in
expected price between the chosen and forgone altemative as the dependent variable suggests
that the manipulation worked. The effect for feedback condition is significant (F(2,69)-5.96,
p~.01), while the category effect is not (F(1,69}-1.34, NS).
' The effect of writing instrument was no[ significant in any of the anatyses repotted suUsequently.
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- Insert Table 1 about here -
Our focus is the impact of choice feedback on satisfaction and purchase intentions.
We expect to replicate the results ofprevious work on regret and satisfaction and extend this
work to examine the mediating role of satisfaction in regret effects on purchase intention. On
the first count, the results indeed seem to replicate prior findings. Subjects in the regret
condition were less satisfied with their writing instrument than subjects in the rejoicing
condition, while responses for subjects in the neutral feedback condition were between those
for the regret and rejoicing groups. A 2 (pen or pencil) x 3(regret, neutral, rejoicing)
ANOVA of satisfaction with choice difficulty, impottance of price, and difference in
familiarity of the two brands as covariates supports our thesis that regret impacts satisfaction
(F(2,67}-7.90, p~.001). The only other significant factor was choice difficutty
(F(1,67~4.25, p~.05). Interestingly, satisfaction and choice difficulty were inversely related
- the more difficult the choice, the less satisfied the subjects seemed to be with their chosen
altemative.
We use the method described by Baron and Kenny ( 1986) to test the mediational role
of satisfaction in the regret-purchase intentions relationship. Specifically, we estimate the
effect of outcome feedback on the proposed mediator (i.e., satisfaction) and the dependent
variable ( i.e., purchase intentions), both with and without incorporating the effect of the
mediator. Perfect mediation is demonstrated if the independent variable exerts significant
effects on the mediator as well as the dependent variable but the effect of the independent
variable on the dependent variable falls to insignificance when the mediating vaziable is
incorporated as a covariate. If the effect remains significant but the effect size significantly
reduces, partial mediation is demonstrated.
We have already demonstrated the direct effect ofoutcome feedback on satisfaction,
so we turn to the analyses involving purchase intentions as the dependent variable. As
expected, the 2 ( pen or pencil) x 3(regret, neutral, rejoicing) ANOVA of purchase intentions
with choice difficulty, importance of price, and difference in familiarity of the two brands as
covariates rettuns a significant effect for outcome feedback (F(2,67~16.38, p~.001).
Ptuchase intentions monotonically decreased from the rejoicing condition (10.8) to the
neutral condition (8.7) to the rogret condition ( 4.9). As before, the only other significant
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effect is for choice difficulty (F(1,67)-31.61, p~.00])- as choice difficulty increased
subjects were less likely to purchase the same brand.
When satisfaction is added as an independent variable, it demonstrates a strong effect
on repurchase intentions (F(1,66)-30.41, p~.001), while the effect of choice difficulty is
undiminished ( F(1,67)-26.96, p~.001). Conversely, the effect of outcome feedback is
slightly reduced, but remains clearly significant (F(2,67)-9.19, p~.001). Since the outcome
feedback effect falls from an F statistic of 16.38 to an F statistic of9.19 when satisfaction is
added to the analysis, we conclude that satisfaction only parlia!!y mediates the e~Ject q~
regret on purchase intentions. In other words, our results suggest that feedback has a direct
effect on likelihood ofrepurchase. Figure 2 depicts the average level of satisfaction and
purchase intention elicited at the three different levels of regret. It clearly shows why
satisfaction fails to completely mediate the regret effects on purchase intentions. Between
the neutral level and rejoicing, satisfaction and purchase intentions are collinear. However,
they diverge in the regret condition. This pattern of results shows that insight into consumers
feelings of regret may provide marketing managers with information about future purchase
intentions that cannot be derived from consumer satisfaction assessments alone. It thereby
underscores the importance of regret for consumer behavior researchers.
- Insert Figure 2 about here -
STUDY 2
Study 2 explores three main issues. First, we examine the differential effects of
switching versus repeat purchasing on regret. Second, we expect an interaction between
action and prior experience. Specifically, switching should lead to less regret when the prior
experience was negative while repeat purchase should result in less regret when the prior
experience was positive. Finally, we examine this phenomenon across several different
consumer choice contexts.
[n order to address the question of whether repeat purchases or brand switching will
result in more regret we draw on the extensive stream of social psychology research
addressing regret following action versus inaction (for a review see Gilovich and Medvec
1995). Virtually all of these studies show that outcomes realized through a decision to act
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lead to more regret than the same outcomes realized through a decision not to act. Gilovich
and Medvec (1995) conclude that this is "the clearest and most frequently replicated finding"
(p. 380) in the field.Z Here our aim is to build on recent work by Zeelenberg et aL (1998a),
who show [hat in some instances people may regret inaction more than action. Specifically,
they report that subjects indicated more regret for soccer coaches who decided to act and
change their team before the next match, than for soccer coaches who decided not to act.
However, when the soccer team had lost the prior match, coaches who decided to act were
judged as less regretful than those who decided not to act. Zeelenberg et al. conclude that
prior outcomes can provide reasons for action and that these reasons may attenuate the regret
felt when decisions gces awry. In other words, since regret is related to blaming oneself,
decision makers are less likely to blame themselves fot a decision when there were good
reasons supporting it.
Relating this to consumer reseazch, reseazch in marketing has consistently shown that
consumers are more likely to switch brands when a prior experience is negative. When the
experience is positive or neutral consumers tend to remain inactive and stick to their chosen
brand (e.g., Tellis and Gaeth 1990). It may be the case that both regret aversion and the
action-inaction dichotomy play a role. It is conceivable that consumers have a tendency to
repeat purchases (i.e., inaction) following a good experience because they anticipate the
regret they may feel following a switch that turns out to be unsatisfactory. By the sanie
token, they may be inclined to switch brands (i.e., action) following a bad experience (even
when this was a highly unprobable event) because they anticipate the regret they would feel if
the decisions turns out to be unsatisfactory again.
In our second study we test the central assumption underlying this reasoning -
consumers regret switching more when prior experiences are good and they regret repeat
purchases more when prior experiences aze bad. Identifying such a pattern makes a twofold
' Gilovich and Medvec (1995) present data showing that in the long run people seem to regret inaction more
than action. In response, Kahneman (1995) argues there are two different types of regret hot reeret and wistful
reeret. Hot regret refers to the direct, more intense, emotional reaction to a decision outcome and is typically
associated with the tendency to `kick yourself. Wistful regret, being the less intense emotion, is "associated
with pleasantly sad fantasies of what might have been" (Kahneman 1995, p. 391). In a recent joint publication
Gilovich, Medvec and Kahneman (1998) agree on [he existence of bo[h types of regret. We focus here on the
more typical "hot" regrct.
Il
contribution to the literature. First, it extends the actionlinaction research to the domain of
consumer decisions. More importantly, it offers evidence counter to the claim that action is
universally regretted more than inaction.
METHOD
Subjecls and Design. One hundred and forty nine undergraduate business students at
a large Midwestem university participated in the study and were compensated by extra credit.
We manipulated action between subjects at two levels ( switch or repeat purchase) and prior
experience between subjects at two levels (positive or negative).
Procedure. Each subject examined three scenarios describing a situation regarding an
experience with a service or product. One scenario described an airline, a second involved a
backpack, while the third described a hotel stay. Prior experience was manipulated
straightforwardly by describing the experience as being either incident-free (positive) or
unpleasant in some fashion ( negative). The subject was then described as either switching to
a different altemative on the subsequent choice occasion or selecting the same altemative as
in the prior experience. In order to induce a sense of regret, the second experience was
always negative regazdless of condition. Scenario order was randomized. An example of
each scenario is shown in the appendix.
Measures. Following the scenario, subjects completed three summated scales. All
responses were on a 10 point scale. The first was a three-item scale (a-0.94) assessing the
study's believability (anchored by "very unrealistic-very realistic," very implausible-very
plausible," and "very unbelievable-very believable"). The second, two-item scale (a-0.79)
assessed empathy with the character in the scenario in terms of how much the subjects felt
they could identify with the character (anchored by "did not identify at all-identified a great
deal") and how easily they could imagine themselves in that situation ( anchored by "not easy
at all-very easy"). The final scale assessed subjects' regret with the decision to switch or
repeat via three questions (a~.73): How much would you regret your decision to stay with
(swilch to) a-? (anchored by "not regret at all-regret very much"), Ifyou could do i! over,
would you change your decision? (anchored by "definitely would change-definitely would
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not change"), and How much happier would you have been ifyou had made a different
decisron? (anchored by "not much happier-much happier").
RESULTS
We analyze the data using a 2(positivelnegative experience) x 2(actiort~inaction) x 3
(context) repeated measures ANOVA. Means by condition are given in Table 2. Subjects
are nested within experience and actionlinaction condition. Thus, we test the experience and
action main effects and the experience x action interaction using the subject mean squaze as
the denominator in the F test (Edwazds 1985). Similarly, we test the scenazio main effect and
all othet interactions using the scenario x subject mean square as the denominator in the F
test. The rCsults reveal the expected interaction between action and experience (F(1,145) -
45.62, p~.01). Further, the main effect of action is significant (F(1,145) - 11.06, p~.01).
Neither the prior experience main effect (F(1,145)-1.20, NS) nor the context main effect
(F(2,285~.58, NS) aze significant. Unexpectedly, the three-way interaction between action,
experience, and context is significant (F(2,432)-4.90, p~.0] ). No other significant effects
emerged.'
- Insert Table 2 about here -
Figures 3a and 3b show the pooled results and scenazio-specific results, respectively.
As expected, regret is significantly greater (t,,, ~ó 7.61, p~.01)" in the switch condition when
the prior experience is positive (7.5) than when it is negative (5.8). The reverse is the case in
the repeat condition; regret is significantly greater (t,,,,o5.69, p~.01) when the prior
experience is negative (8.1) than when it is positive (6.8). The result is a significant
disordinal interaction between action and experience.
- Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here -
Interestingly, the main effect ofaction is driven by regret being rg eater for repeat
purchasing (7.4) than for switching (6.7). This is counter to the literature on status quo bias,
but is quite consistent with our thesis that providing reasons for the decision mitigates regret.
Specifically, subjects seem to have reasoned that at least they had tried to avoid the regret by
switching in response to the prior outcome. The pattem of results suggests that subjects did
' The believability and empathy scales were included as covariates, but had no impact on the results.
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not feel that switching or repeating were much different in light ofa positive prior. However,
subjects felt much more strongly when the prior was negative.
It is readily apparent from Figure 3b that the three-way interaction is driven by
disparate responses in the backpack scenario versus the airline and hotel scenarios. Separate
ANOVAs on each scenario' reveals a significant action X experience interaction in each
scenario, but a significant action main effect only in the airline (F(1,142) - 7.98, p~.01) and
hotel (F(1,141) - 8.71, p~.01) scenarios. Interestingly, subjects were less extreme in their
feelings about regret in the backpack scenario. This could be driven either by the relative
extremity of the prior experience described in the scenarios or by the magnitude of the loss
(airlines and hotels are much costlier than backpacks). Untangling these effects presents an
interesting direction for future research.
STUDY 3
In the third study we focus on the upstream part ofour regret continuum and examine
the role of potential regret in consumer choice. Specifically, we test the proposition that
expectations of outcome feedback can lead to consttmers making riskier choices. Our thesis
is that consumers are regret averse, that is, they have a preference for options that minimize
futtue regret. Hence, anticipated regret may promote either risk aversion or risk seeking
depending on which option is regret-minimizing. Unfortunately, in most studies of regret,
regret aversion and risk aversion are confounded. For example, in the often-used choice
between a gamble and a sure thing, if a subject opts for the sure thing sllte normally does not
learn whether the gamble would have been better. Conversely, if sltte opts for the gamble
s~lte will always leam the outcome of the gamble and the outcome of the sure thing.
Choosing the sure thing offers protection from regret. T'hus, someone who anticipates regret
should opt for the sure thing, thereby revealing risk aversion.
Evidence for regret aversion that avoids this confounding of regret aversion and risk
aversion is scarce. Zeelenberg et al. (1996) were the first to disentangle regret aversion and
risk aversion, showing that anticipated regret may also cause a preference for risk-seeking.
' We use the experiment-wide estimate af error in all of our t-tests.
` These arc available from the authors.
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However, they only consider matched gambles. In their studies, participants were presented
with two equally attractive gambles, one being relatively risky and the other being refatively
safe. All three experiments induded a Feedback Sufer Gamble condition in which the safer
gamble would always be resolved and a Feedback Riskier Gamble condition in which the
riskier gamble would always be resolved. In addition to this feedback all participants
expected to learn the outcome of the chosen gamble. As predicted, participants in Feedback
Safer Gamble condition opted predominantly for the safer gamble, which would provide
them with feedback only on the chosen gamble and thereby protect them from threatening
feedback on the riskier gamble. Conversely, participants in the Feedback Riskier Gmnble
condition opted predominantly for the riskier gamble.
Similarly, Zeelenherg and Beattie (1997, Experiments 2a and 26) present results of
two studies involving the expectation of feedback in the ultimatum game. They find that
proposers made lower (i.e., riskier) offers when they knew that they would find out the
lowest acceptable offer to the responder. [mportantly, Zeelenberg and Beattie ( I 997,
Experiment I) also consider the richer context of investment decisions. Participants were
asked io choose between two investment options that differed in riskiness. Participants in the
Riskier Feedback condition were told that their sister had invested in the risky option (thus.
they would receive feedback on this option). In the No Feedback condition this information
was absent. Consistent with regret aversion, the No Feedback participants preferred to invest
in the safer investment, while the Riskier Feedback participants preferred the riskier
investment. Unfortunately, in this study feedback was confounded by the fact that the
protagonist's sister invested in the risky option. The results may be driven by the additional
information provided by knowledge of the sister's decision. Further, there was no condition
in which feedback was forthcoming on the less risky investment.
To date, little is known about whether this tendency to avoid post-decisional regret
exists in real-life consumer decision making. In the present study we therefore test these
notions in the context of brand choice, involving complex, multi-attribute decision-making.
Moreover, we do so with choices that vary in terms of their overall riskiness, allowing us to
test the generality ofotu predictions for several different consumer decisions.
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In our third study we had subjects make choices between pairs of conswner goods
that differed in the amount of risk that was associated with them. One was less risky (e.g.,
moderate quality but relatively certain), the other more risky (potentially better quality, but a
chance of worse quality). There were three feedback conditions: the no feedback condition,
the less risky feedback condition, and the more risky feedback condition. [n the no feedback
condition subjects did not expect to obtain outcome feedback on the unchosen alternative.
They did expect outcome feedback on the chosen altemative because they would experience
this during consumption. We predicted that these subjects would have a preference for the
less risky alternative, showing overall risk aversion. Subjects in the risky feedback condition
expected to obtain outcome feedback on the risky altemative ( e.g., this altemative would be
evaluated in the next issue ofConsumer Reports). If they were to opt for the less risky
altemative they would be able to compare the performance of the chosen less risky
alternative to that of the unchosen risky alternative. This comparison could produce regret.
Opting for the risky alternative protects them from this regret. Therefore we predict that
subjects in the risky feedback condition will show an increased preference for the risky
alternative, compared to the no feedback subjects. Similazly we predict that participants in
the less risky feedback conditions will show an increased preference for the less risky
altemative.
In addition to the manipulation of feedback we also manipulated the overall riskiness
of the choice contexts. Recent reseazch by Ritov ( 1996) suggests that it is not only the
expectation of feedback that influences whether decision makers take into account the
possible future regret, but also the expected amount of the regret ( i.e., the magnitude of the
potential regret). When choices aze more risky the expected value of postdecisional regret is
greater. Therefore we predict suonger effects for the more risky choice contexts.
METHOD
Subjects and Design. Subjects were 67 undergraduate students at a large Midwestem
business school who completed the survey in return for course credit. We manipulated
outcome feedback between subjects and riskiness of the choice within subjects in a mixed
design.
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Procedure. Similar to Study 2, subjects read scenarios describing various decision
situations involving a choice between two alternatives. Each scenario was pretested so that
one alternative was judged to be inherently more risky than the other. Further, the decision
contexts were designed so that some decisions were riskier than others, then pretested. I3ased
on the pretest, scenarios concerning selection ofan apartment and a personal computer (6.3
and 5.3, respectively, on a 10 point scale) were judged to be riskier than choice of an
answering service and selection ofa long distance provider (3.3 and 3.9, respectively). The
order ofpresentation was randomized.
As already described, we manipulated outcome feedback at three levels: risky
alternative, less risky altemative, and none. For example, when outcome feedback was be to
forthcoming on the risky long distance carrier, subjects read "You pick up an issue of the
local paper to discover that new smaller long distance carriers will be reviewed in an
upcoming issue." As mentioned above, outcome feedback was manipulated between
subjects, while riskiness of the choice was manipulated within subject. An example ofeach
scenario is shown in the appendix.
Measures. Immediately following the scenario, subjects were immediately asked to
record which option they would choose. They were then asked their likelihood of choosing
each of the options on a 10 point scale (anchored by "definitely not choose-definitely
choose"). These questions were followed by several manipulation checks. The first two
questions assessed subjects' perceived risk of each option on a 10 point scale (to test the
manipulation of the relative riskiness of each alternative). These were followed by a question
asking how risky the subject felt the overall choice context to be (to test the decision risk
manipulation). Finally, the subject was asked whether additional information would be
forthcoming on each altemative (to test the outcome feedback manipulation). Unfortunately,
the feedback manipulation check for the answering service was not significantly different
between feedback groups. The mean in the less risky option feedback condition should have
been less than in the more risky option feedback condition, but for some reason the means
were almost identical (5.1 and 5.2 for the less risky and more risky option conditions,
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respectively). Thus, we did not include the answering service scenario in the subsequent
analyses.`
RESULTS
Means by condition are shown in Table 3. In order to test whether the fecdback
scenarios manipulated the perceived riskiness of the choice as intended, we ran a 3(feedback
conditions) x 3(scenarios) ANOVA using riskiness of the overall choice as the dependent
vaziable. As hoped, the scenario effect is significant (F(2,192)-24.87, p~.001), while neither
the feedback condition effect (F(2,192)-0.14, NS) nor the feedback x scenario interaction
(F(4,192)-0.92, NS) are significant. Thus, the manipulation seems to have achieved the
desired effects. The scenarios successfully manipulated riskiness of the choice and feedback
condition exerted no influence in this regazd.
- Insert Table 3 about here -
We then conducted a similar 3 x 3 ANOVA using choice likelihood of the risky
altetnative as the dependent variable. We added the difference in perceived risk between the
higher risk and lower risk alternatives as a covariate.' Inclusion of this variable allows us to
control for differences in relative risk between the two options across scenarios. We refer to
this variable as the riskgap. The effect of risk gap is significant (F(1,188)-27.43, p~.001),
suggesting that as the difference in perceived risk increased, subjects were increasingly
reticent to choose the riskier alternative (i.e., subjects displayed risk aversion on average).
Similar to Study 2, subjects aze nested within feedback condition so we test the
feedback main effect using the subject mean square as the denominator in the F test and test
the scenario main effect and feedback X scenazio interaction using the scenario x subject
mean square as the denominator. As expected, the feedback main effect (F(2,64)~.13,
p~.05) is significant. Subjects gravitated toward the option on which feedback was
forihcoming. Choice likelihood monotonically increased from the less risky option feedback
condition (7.2) to the control, no feedback condition (8.4), to the risky option feedback
condition (9.5).
' Results are substantively unchanged if the answering service condition is included.
' As in Study 2, we included believability and empa[hy as covariates. Again, neither is significant.
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Further, the scenario main effect (F(2,124)-5.52, p~.01) is significant. As predicted.
subjects were more regret averse in contexts where greater risk was involved (the apartment
and the computer purchase) than where the choice could be easily reversed later (the long
distance service provider). The feedback x scenario interaction is not signiticant
(F(4,124)-0.47, NS), suggesting that the feedback effect was robust across the scenarios.
Similarly, as shown in Table 3, the risky option's choice share increased by 16 sharc
points (from 21.0"~o to 37.Oo~o) when feedback was forthcoming on the riskier option and
declined by almost half (to 10.6"~0) in the less risky option feedback condition (X'--12.2,
p~.01). Results ofa binomial logit model with choice of the risky option as the dependent
variable mirror those for the choice likelihood analysis. Main effects are evident for
feedback cundition (x2-9.7, p{.Ol ), risk gap (xZ-7.8, p~.01), and scenario (x'--4.6, p~.10).
The interaction between feedback condition and scenario is not significant (x'-1.0, NS).
Figures 4a and 4b show the choice share of the risky option and its choice likelihood
across scenarios, respectively. Both graphs show a clear pattern ofeffects across levels of
feedback. Specifically, subjects were more likely to choose the risky option (compared to the
no feedback condition) if they knew that they would subsequently receive outcome feedback
on it and were less likely to choose it if feedback was forthcoming on the less risky option.
- Insert Figures 4a and 46 about here -
DISCUSSION
The contributions of this reseazch aze fourfo(d. First, we present theory depicting the
role of regret throughout the consumer decision-making process. Second, we show that
satisfaction dces not completely mediate regret effects on subsequent behavioc Third, we
find that (conttary to previous research) inaction can lead to greater regret than action and
that action interacts with previous experience in driving felt regret. Finally, we present an
examination of the role ofpotential regret in consumer decision making and find that
consumets' decisions are influenced by the specter of regret.
The first empirical finding suggests that Figure 1 is in need of modification. We need
to add a direct effect of regret on behavioral consequences in addition to the indirect effect
mediated by the psychological consequences. This finding is very important as it indicates a
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"double whammy" effect of regret. Regret influences purchase intentions not only through
satisfaction, but directly as well. This highlights the need for service providers and product
manufacturers to adopt a broader perspective to their outcome measurement and in setting
performance objectives. In other words, simply meeting expectations is insufficient. If
forgone alternatives aze seen as superior, satisfaction and, more importantly, repeat purchasc
rates suffer.
The second finding has implications for the stream of research on action versus
inaction. [t suggests that previous information or experience regarding the underlying
reasons for the decision can have a pronounced impact on felt regret. If there is sufficient
motivation to warrant a switch, then consumers feel less regret in the face of a subsequent
negative performance by the chosen altemative. For practitioners, this implies that feelings
of regret are mitigated to the extent to which the consumer retrospects and concludes that the
decision was appropriate given the available information. Interestingly, at least in the context
of brand choice, switching seems to produce less regret than repeat purchase. In light of our
findings in Study 3, consumers who anticipate greater regret for repeat purchase than for
switching should be more likely to switch as a result. This phenomenon could be caused by
consumers' high expectations of service providers and product manufacturers. Failures are
perceived as intolerable events and to be avoided by switching to an altemative provider.
Finally, the third empirical finding implies that potential feedback has a marked
influence on choice behavior. Consumers seem to avoid potential regret by choosing the
altemative on which feedback will be forthcoming. Importantly, this influence can lead them
to choose riskier altematives rather than becoming risk averse. This is an important finding
for behavioral researchers in that it demonstrates that regret aversion and risk aversion are
distinct constructs and that failure to consider regret aversion effects can lead to false
interpretation of the process underlying consumer choice behavior.
For practitioners, this suggests that a brand's share should increase monotonically as
its relative probability of feedback increases. This would partially explain why investors
gravitate to blue chip stocks - they may feel that the probability of feedback on their
performance is greater relative to smaller cap stocks. Similarly, Coke's large advantage in
fountain service might explain its advantage in retail sales. Consumers know that they are
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much more likely to be exposed to Coke than to its competitors in institutional settings. Of
course, these musings aze somewhat speculative and need to be empirically examined.
We also find that the effect of potential regret on choice is greater in instances where
switching costs are higher. This makes sense in that finding that one has made a poor choice
should induce less regret if the decision is easily undone (e.g., "Leelenberg et al. 19986).
Thus, potential regret's influence on the decision should be less. Alterna[ively, as the stakes
increase and the consequences of the decision aze more pennanent, potential regret increases
and regret aversion should play a larger role in the decision-making process. This presents a
double-edged sword for practitioners. On the one hand, making the decision easy to undo
(e.g., money back guazantees) is advantageous, particularly for riskier brands, as this lessens
the effect ofpntential regret and lowers the decision stakes. On the other hand, lower risk
(e.g., high quality) brands should attempt to increase the stakes. For instance, many popular
mutual funds chazge fees for redemption of funds invested less than 90 days and on-line
services often charge a disconnect fee. Such fees make consumers "think twice" about
switching. Of course, the advantages of such fees must be balanced against the cost of
potentially deterring new customers who anticipate the second order regret involved with
switching services in the future.
We feel that forgone outcome feedback is not a raze occurrence in consumers' lives.
Rather, it occurs quite frequently, either intentionally through actively seeking feedback on
forgone alternatives (e.g., reading Consumer Reports) or unintentionally (e.g., casual word of
mouth). It is interesting to note (see Table 3) that subjects across feedback conditions did not
tend to use the extremes of the feedback scales for the manipulation check in Study 3.
Rather, the means were all between five and eight on our 1-10 scale. Subjects seemed to
allocate some probability to receiving outcome feedback regardless of whether this was
directly indicated in the scenario. This suggests that consumers may anticipate receiving
feedback on forgone altetnatives on a regular basis, perhaps through advertising, word of
mouth, or direct observation.
One issue that we have not addressed is whether the experience and consideration of
regret leads to better or worse decisions. On balance, we feel that, over the long term,
anticipating regret is a positive aspect of choice. By anticipating not only outcomes but the
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consequences thereof, consumers should be in a position to make choices that deliver greater
overall utility. However, regret minimization per se is probably a suboptimal choice rulc, as
minimizing regret may result in an increase in other types of decision-related atTect such as
disappointment (e.g., Irtman et al. 1997; Zeelenberg et aL ] 998b).
While anecdotal evidence regarding regret's role in consumer decision-making effect
is plentiful, heretofore no one has systematically explored regret's role throughout the whole
consumer choice process, including the behavioral consequences that follow from a regretted
decision. For instance, regret has cleaz implications for new product sampling programs by
making the forgone alternative more salient. Letting consumers "know what they've been
missing" should increase subsequent switching to the sampled brand. Similarly, strategies
that remove or lessen the potential for regret should increase purchase likelihood. "Low price
guarantees" and guaranteed softwaze upgrades are examples of such strategies. Both seek to
assure consumers that they will receive the benetit of a lower price or performance
enhancements should they subsequently become available in the mazket.
Our results clearly show that consumers are motivated to avoid regret. In other
words. consumers seem to be regret averse (cf Zeelenberg ei aL 1996; Zeelenberg and
Beattie 1997). [ndeed, indivíduals who do not anticipate feelings of regret are azguably more
likely to be at risk ofengaging in maleficent behavior. Hence, persuasive communications
that elicit or enhance this regret aversion may be efficient tools for marketers, consumer
groups, or government agencies. For instance, promotion restrictions such as time limits
(e.g., Inman and McAlister 1994) seek to enhance consumer regret by making the
approaching expiration date (and loss of the opportunity to avail oneself of the deal) salient.
Regret appeals such as "Think of how you'll feel if you miss this sale!" may be quite
effective in this regard. As the title of this paper suggests, practitioners already apply these
"regret appeals; ' albeit in a naïve and ad hoc fashion. A similar communication strategy is
currently seen in the "Well, not exactly" campaign for Hertz.
A recent British prevention campaign "the choice is up to you," promoting safe sex,
uses a different type of regret appeal (see, Richard, van der Pligt and de Vries 1995). Part of
this campaign is an ad with a photograph of a young man and woman in bed. Two scenarios
are depicted next to the photograph. (n the first scenario the reader of the ad is encouraged to
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imagine having had unprotected sex the night before, followed by the question asking how
the reader would feel now ("perhaps a little worried?"). This is followed by general
information about AIDS transmission. In a second scenario the reader of the ad is
encouraged to imagine having had sex the night before, using a condom. This is again
followed by the question asking how the reader would feel now, suggesting the experience of
positive emotions. Obviously this campaign attempts to influence behavior by increasing the
salience of post-decision regret that could be the result of unsafe sex as well as the salience of
post-decision rejoicing that could be the result of protected sex. In recent empirical work,
Richard et aL (1996) test a similar strategy and find it to be effective both in changing
intentions to use condoms and in increasing condom use following a five month period.
Both types of regrel appeal ean be useful in helping Consumers construct mental
simulation of states of the world which may increase their likelihood of making choices
consistent with achieving desirable states and avoiding undesirable states. The difference in
these two regret appeals is that the first ("Wow, I could have had a V8") focuses the
consumer on the outcome of the decision (and the accompanying regret), whereas the second
emphasizes the process by which one can arrive at a regrettable outcome. In analog to these
two types of regret appeals, Taylor et al. (1998) distinguish between two types of inental
simulation, outcome simulation and process simulation. The findings from their research
suggests that the latter type of regret appeal has a greater impact on behavior. Process-
focussed regret appeals not only motivate consumers to avoid regret, but in addition they
provide guidance as to how to do so.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Continued resean:h on the role of regret in consumer choice is needed to increase our
understanding of the role of regret appeals and regret-oriented marketing strategies (e.g.,
price guatantees, free upgrades, samples) in the choice process. Specifically, the prediction
that process-focused regret appeals are more impactful than outcome-focused appeals is an
intriguing direction for future research. Further, profiling those types of individuals who (a)
feel that they might receive feedback and (b) anticipate the regret which would occur as a
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result and (c) take this into account in their decision-making would be a fruitful task in
targeting individualized preventive communications campaigns.
We focused here only on regret. It would be worthwhile to examine the role of other
decision-related emotions (both anticipated and experienced). One likely candidate is
disappointment, the feeling experienced in comparing a received outcome versus prior
expectations (e.g., Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden 1982). Disappointment has been shown to
influence post-choice valuation (Inman et aL 1997) independently of regret effects. Inman et
aL (1997) and Mellers et al. (1998) both present utility conceptualizations describing how
both regret and disappointment influence choice and post-choice valuation. However, more
work is needed to examine the relative role of each in decision-making. For example,
priming subjects on choice versus consequences could make quite a difference in the relative
impact ofdisappointment versus regret. Further, the temporal pattems of disappointment and
regret aze unexplored. Regret may be much more salient temporally proximate to the
decision. However, over time this effect may decline as counterfactuals emerge and
consumer engage in post hoc rationalization to ameliorate the pain of regret.
In all of our studies, we did not allow consumers to delay their decision to cope with
regret. Research suggests that consumers might either avoid feedback (e.g., Janis and Mann
1977) or avoid decisions altogether (e.g., Beattie et al. 1994; Luce 1998) as mechanisms of
dealing with potential regret. This azea represents a fascinating direction for future work. As
discussed earlier (see footnote 2), researchers argue that there aze different types of regret
(e.g., Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman 1998). "Hot" regret is strongest immediately
following decisions involving action, while "wistful" regret is manifested over time and tends
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Sample Stimuli from Each Study
Studv 1: Rearet Condition
Forgone Pen Evaluation
"The {forgone pen} is a very good pen overall. It fits well in the writer's hand. After using
it for an extended period, we found it to remain comfortable. The ink flow was very smooth and it
did not skip or blob at all. Even the retracting mechanism functioned smoothly, never sticking as did
many other pens.
This pen upholds the tradition of high quality that {forgone pen } has earned. Flowever, tlie
packaging will probably lead many consumers to underestimate this pen. Overall, it is the equal of
'Cross-class' pens in the á10-á15 range."
Cáosen Pen Evnluation
"The {chosen pen} is a rather poor pen overall. The ink flow was not as smooth and unifonn
as many other pens which we tested. Also, i[ often failed to write immediately, perhaps because the
ball has a tendency to dry out. Over an extended period, we found it to be increasingly
uncomfortable to grip.
We found that this pen did not live up to the reputation of {chosen pen}. This pen is
something of a"knockoff' of higher quality pens. We would compare it to `Bic-class' pens in the
ál-á1.50 range."
~g
Studv 2: Positive Prior. Repeat Purchase Condition
Airline Scenario
You've graduated from school and landed a job that you're excited about and carries a lot of
responsibility. One Monday morning you learn you have to fly out to Omaha on Wednesday to meet
with a client. Your assistant books you on Air Nebraska. On Wednesday your flight is uneventful
and you spend the next couple of days with the client.
You're back in the office on Friday and realize you have to return to Omaha the next week to wrap
up business. You look at flying Great Plaines Airlines but dccide to have your assistant book you on
Air Nebraska again. When you arrive in Omaha, they've lost your luggage so you can't change out
of your casual clothes before your meeting.
BqCkpack Scenario
It's fall and you're about to start your freshman year at wllcge. The time has come tn En shopping
for those essential items every college student needs: jeans, sweatshirts and a new backpack. l'he
Toughpack you purchased for your senior year in high school is in good shape, but it's too small for
all those college textbooks you just bought.
When you go shopping this time, you look at Sturdypack, but decide to buy another Toughpack with
the same features, only it's bigger. All of your books fit perfectly and you're off to class. A week
later however, as you're leaving your dorm room, the seams burst and all of your books spill to the
floor.
Hole! Scenario
You're excited because you've traveled to a distant city for your second job interview with a
company you'd like to work for. The company lets you choose the hotel so you decide to stay at
Snuglnn. You room is comfortable and quiet. You wake refreshed and ready for your interview.
Several weeks later a friend and you decide to go on a long car trip. You consider stopping at a hotel
chain called Sleeptight, but decide to stay in a nearby Snuglnri again. You arrive and change to go
out for dinner forgetting your watch on the nightstand. When you come back your watch is missing.
The manager refuses to compensate you.
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Study 3~ Feedback on Less Risky Alternative Condition
Apartment Scenario
For your last year at the University you decide to find an apartment by yourself. It will cost a little
more but will be quiet when you need to study and you won't have to worry about privacy or who's
going to do the dishes. Your budget is tight and you want to save as much as you can. You have
narrowed your choice down to two places.
When you went to look at Doty Apartments, you thought you could hear someone in the apartment
above you so you're concerned about how soundproof it will be. The other place. Palantine Village,
is a really good deal on a month-to-month lease, but you've heard a rumor the entire building might
be converted into condominiums. If that happened your lease would be terminated and you'd have to
find a new place in the middle of the semester where you could stay until you graduate in May. You
have a friend of a friend who is moving into Doty Apartments, so you know you will find out if the
building is soundproof.
Computer Scenario
It's a month before the beginning of your Junior year. You've decided buying a computer for your
apartment would be a good investment and have narrowed the choice down to a local retail store or a
distant mail-order company. You have 53000 to spend. The local computer store has a solid
reputation. You feel you can trust the local store to build a quality machine for you, while you're
much less certaín about the mail-order company as you have heard it takes forever to get through to
customer service and if something went wrong with your new machine you would have to mail it
back to the company for repair.
The reason you're considering the mail-order company is you can purchase a significantly faster,
upgradeable machine with more components than you could buy from the local store with the same
amount of money. You need to make a purchase decision now because you know you'll need the
machine immediately for a heavy course load. You pick up an issue of the Isthmus to discover
computers from the local store will be reviewed in an issue next month.
Long Distanee Serviee Scenario
You're excited for school to begin this year you've moved out of the dormitory into your own place
with a couple of friends. It's about one week before the beginning of your lease and you've decided
now would be a good time to call and setup phone service. You're not quite sure which long
distance carrier to choose, but have decided the carrier will either be the dominant ABC company or
the new, smaller DDE company. ABC offers a low rate guarantee paying double the difference back
for an overcharge while DDE is a new carrier promising the same low rates and claims service just as
good as ABC. You pick up an issue of the Badger Herald to discover large long distance carriers
like ABC will be reviewed in an upcoming issue.
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Table 1
Study 1 Means Across Conditions
(Standard deviation in parentheses)
Regret Neutral Rejoicing
(n-25) (n-25) (n-24)
Satisfaction 7.0 8.2 9.6
(2.65) (2.37) (1.07)
Purchase Intentions 4.9 8.7 10.8
(3.83) (3.58) (1.30)
Choice Difficulty 4.2 3.6 2.6
(3.52) (3.37) (2.15)
Price Importance 6.2 8.0 6.5
(3.80) (3.46) (3.43)
Choice Familiarity 1.4 -0.72 -1.42
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Study 3 Means Across Conditions
Feedback Condition




21.9"~0 10.60~0 21.Oo~o 37.010
Risky Option
Choice Likelihood
8.3 7.2 8.4 9.5
Risk Gap' 3. I 3.3 3.6 2.5
Choice Risk 5.3 5.3 5.3 S.d




21.2"ro 9.SoIo I8.5"ro 38.9oro
Risky Option
Choice Likelihood
8.5 7.7 8.3 9.8
Risk Gap~ 2.7 2.4 3.3 2.3
Choice Risk 6.3 6.2 6.5 6.3




31.3"ro 13.6"ro 33.3"Io SO.Ooro
Risky Option
Choice Likelihood
9.2 7.7 9.7 103 -
Rísk Gap' 3.4 3.5 4.0 2.1
Choice Riak 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.4





13.4"Io 9.1 "Io I 1.1 "~a 22.2"~0
Risky Option
Choice Likelihood
7.2 6.1 7.1 8.5
Risk Gap' 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.0
Choice Risk 3.9 3.7 3.6 4.6
Fecdback Manip Ck 5.3 NA 7.8
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Figure 3b
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